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Jones v. State: 
ITIS WITHIN 
THE TRIAL 
JUDGE'S 
DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE 
WHICH CRIME 
OF VIOLENCE 
CONSTITUTES 
THE THIRD 
CONVICTION FOR 
THE PURPOSE 
OF IMPOSING 
AN ENHANCED 
SENTENCE UNDER 
ARTICLE 27, § 
643B(C). 
RECIEN't DEVELOPfVHENTS 
In Jones v. State, 336 
Md. 255,647 A.2d 1204(1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that it is within the 
sound discretion of the sentenc-
ing judge to select which of a 
defendant's convictions will 
serve as the third crime ofvio-
lence for the purpose of imp os-
ing a mandatory enhanced sen-
tence under article 27, section 
643B( c) of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland. In so ruling, the 
court concluded that a defen-
dant is not entitled to have a 
section 643B(c) penalty imposed 
upon the conviction that will 
result in the mildest aggregate 
sentence. 
In the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County, a jury con-
victed Duane Thomas Jones of 
second degree rape, second de-
gree sexual offense, and rob-
bery. All three convictions arose 
from the same incident which 
occurred on March 15, 1991. 
Jones had previously served a 
term in a correctional institution 
following convictions for two 
separate crimes of violence. 
Under article 27, section 
643B( c) of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland, a person who has 
been convicted oftwo crimes of 
violence arising from separate 
incidents and has served a term 
in a correctional institution as a 
result of a conviction of a crime 
of violence shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for at least twen-
ty-five years upon being con-
victed of a third crime of vio-
lence. For the purpose of im-
posing the section 643B( c) pen-
alty upon Jones, the trial judge 
selected the robbery conviction 
as the third offense. Jones did 
not contest that he satisfied the 
requirements for a section 
643B(c) penalty. However, 
Jones did contend that section 
643B(c) is ambiguous, and 
therefore, pursuant to the rule 
oflenity, must be construed so 
as to require that the section 
643B( c) penalty be imposed on 
the conviction that would result 
in the mildest sentence. 
Without the section 
643B(c) penalty, the maximum 
sentence Jones would have re-
ceived is fifty years-- ten years 
for robbery, and twenty years 
each for second degree rape and 
second degree sexual offense, 
the terms to run consecutively. 
Pursuant to section 643B( c) the 
trial judge imposed the penalty 
upon the robbery conviction, 
and Jones' maximum sentence 
was sixty-five years. In con-
trast, had the second degree 
rape or second degree sexual 
offense served as the third con-
viction, the maximum sentence 
to which Jones would have been 
exposed was fifty-five years. 
The trial court rejected Jones' 
contention that the robbery con-
viction should not serve as the 
third crime of violence and Jones 
appealed. In an unreported opin-
ion, the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland upheld the 
sentence imposed by the trial 
court. The court of special ap-
peals held that selecting the 
crime of violence upon which to 
impose the section 643B( c) pen-
alty is within the discretion of 
the trial judge. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to consider Jones' con-
25.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 65 
tentions. 
In reaching its decision, 
the court of appeals looked at 
the plain meaning of section 
643B( c) and considered the leg-
islative intent behind its enact-
ment. The court began its anal-
ysis by noting that if statutory 
language is ambiguous, the rule 
of lenity requires the court to 
construe the statute in favor of 
the defendant. In rejecting 
Jones' contention that section 
643B( c) is ambiguous, the court 
of appeals determined that be-
cause the language of section 
643B(c) is clear, the rule of 
lenity is not applicable and the 
statute should be applied as 
written. Jones at 261, 647 A.2d 
at 1208. The court reasoned 
that the plain language of sec-
tion 643B(c) provides that a 
third conviction of a crime of 
violence mandates imprison-
ment for no less than twenty-
five years. Because Jones' rob-
bery conviction qualified as a 
third conviction for a crime of 
violence, the judge had author-
ity under section 643B(c) to 
impose the mandatory penalty 
upon that conviction. Id. at 263, 
647 A.2d 1208. 
The court further ex-
plained that to apply a lesser 
sentence when Jones had com-
mitted the second degree rape 
and second degree sexual of-
fense, yet impose a greater sen-
tence had he not, would be in-
consistent with the purpose of 
the statute. Id. According to the 
court, the Legislature's intent in 
promulgating statutes such as 
section 643B(c) was to protect 
society by imposing enhanced 
sentences upon recidivist crim-
inals who fail to refrain from 
criminal activity despite previ-
ous convictions and imprison-
ment. Id. at 264, 647 A.2d at 
1208. The court explained that 
the statute is devoid of any lan-
guagethat suggests a legislative 
intent to prevent judges from 
selecting the conviction with the 
least severe penalty, thereby im-
posing the longest sentence. The 
court reasoned that the legisla-
ture intended that the sentenc-
ingjudge have discretion, based 
upon the nature of the convic-
tions and the criminal history of 
the defendant, to decide which 
crime would best serve as the 
third conviction. Id. at 264-65, 
647 A.2d at 1209. The court 
further supported its holding by 
emphasizing the broad discre-
tion that Maryland grants, in 
general, to trial court judges in 
sentencing criminal defendants. 
Id. at 265, 647 A.2d at 1209. 
In his dissenting opin-
ion, Judge Bell, with whom 
Judge Eldridge joined, rejected 
the majority's construction of 
section 643B(c). The dissent 
maintained that the language of 
section 643B(c) is ambiguous 
and the legislative intent unclear 
and, therefore, the statute should 
be construed according to the 
rule of lenity. Id. at 266, 647 
A.2d at 1209. Reviewing the 
language of section 643B(c), 
the dissent reasoned that had 
the legislature intended for a 
judge to have such broad dis-
cretion in determining the of-
fense to serve as the third crime 
of violence, it could easily have 
provided so more clearly in the 
statute.ld. at 272, 647 A.2d at 
1212. Rejecting the majority's 
reasoning that its holding is firm-
ly based in the plain meaning of 
the statute, the dissent main-
tained that section 643B( c) fails 
to address the situation in which 
there is more than one crime 
that could serve as the third 
conviction. Id. at 269, 647 A.2d 
at 1212. The dissent asserted 
that section 643B(c) does not 
indicate whether the enhanced 
sentence should be applied to 
the conviction with the greatest 
maximum sentence or to the 
one with the most lenient sen-
tence. 
In Jones v. State, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that it is within the discre-
tion of the sentencing judge to 
select which one of a defen-
dant's convictions arising from 
a single incident will serve as the 
third crime of violence for the 
purpose of section 643B(c). By 
rejecting the argument that a 
defendant is entitled to have a 
section 643B( c) penalty imposed 
upon the conviction that will 
result in the least severe sen-
tence, the court construed sec-
tion 643B(c) against recidivist 
criminals. While the opinion is 
limited in that imposition of the 
enhanced sentence remains 
within the discretion of the trial 
judge, the Jones decision repre-
sents the court's increasing con-
cern in protecting society by 
sentencing those who refuse to 
refrain from criminal activity to 
longer terms of imprisonment. 
- Dana G. Vogts 
